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I. INTRODUCTION
The PIDS-OSU research project entitled: "Comparative Bank
Studies in Rural Areas" will examine the performance of rural[
banks (RBs), branches of private cotm_ercial banks (KBs) and
private development banks (PDBs) serving the same rural areas.
The overall objective is to deter_line prospechs for institutional
viability in offering and expanding fiilancial services to rural
clientele in the Philippines (see Grailam [1986]). Primary data
will be collected from a sample of rural banks and branches of
private commercial banks and private development banks.
This paper provides a general background to the
ab0vementioned research project. The findings here could help
the research team in preparing the research design for the
comparative bank studies. The analysis is mainly based on
secondary and more aggregative data. The main objectives are:
(I) to briefly review existing banking regulations; (2) to
describe the performance of the financial system in the most
recent past; (3) to compare the performance of KBs, PDBs and RBs
by region; (4) to test the "interest rate" and "institution
elasticity"_hypotheses using a combination of time series (1983-
85) and cross-section data (13 regions and 3 categories of banks,
namely KBs, PDBs and RBs; and (5) to examine the performance of
individual commercial banks.
Ii. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Financial institutions are operating under the framework set
by the 1980 financial reforms. The main objectives of such
reforms are to : (i) to increase competitive conditions amon_
banks, and (2) to increase the availability of and access to
longer term funds.
The attainment of these objectives, first of all, demands a
restructuring of the banking system. _'igure 1 shows the current
structure of the financial system. Functional distinctions among
banks have been reduced. For example, savings and mortgage
banks, savings and loan associations and private development
banks are not anymore legally different from each other.
Services offered by one category of bank have been broadened to
make banks realize economies of scope and to allow greater
competition among different categories of banks. One significant
feature of the 1980 financial reforms is the creation o_
universal banks which have expanded co_nercial banking functions.
Table 1 summarizes salient regulations which are relevant to
our comparative bank stud'y. The minimum capital requirement
greatly varies among different types of banks. Interestingly,
the current real values of these minimum capital requirements are
substantially below their real values in 1980 because of the 139
percent inflation rate between 1980 and 1986.
Universal banks are allowed to offer a host of banking and
non-banking services, many of which were prohibited before the
Figure 1
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1980 financial reforms. For instance, they can go into
investment or merchant banking which was previously restricted to
I
investment houses only. In short, they can engage in almost all
economic activities. There are however certain limitations. For
instance, they may own voting shares in other commercial Danks
and non-allied enterprises to the extent of 30 percent and 35
percQnt, respectively, of the total Voting shares (see, Annex A
for the list of financial allied and non-financial allied
undertakings). Others not included _ these categories may be
fully owned by them.
Ordinary commercial banks and private development lbanks have
more or less the same restrictions on equity investments as
universal banks, except in two areas: they may own voting shares
in financial allied undertakings but not to exceed 40 percent of
the total voting shares and that they are not allowed to own
shares in non-allied enterprises.
Rural banks are by far the most restricted banking system.
They may invest in financial allied undertakings only upon prior
approval by the Monetary Board. They cannot also own non-allied
enterprises. However, they are permitted to go into non-
financial a_lied undertakings.
The minimum networth to risk assets ratio is 8 percent for
universal banks and i0 percent for other banks. The assumption
here is that bigger and well-capitalized banks are more stable
than smaller banks. The lower networth to risk assets ratio for
universal banks is actually an invitation to banks to expand
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their capital. To avoid undue concentration of wealth, universal
banks are required to undertake a public offering of new shares
to the extent of 10 percent of the required minimum capital.
While mergers/consolidations are being encouraged to reduce
the number of banks to achieve their optimal size, branching has
also been promoted. _For ti_e first time, rural banks are
permitted to open branches, although _ 's,_lll limited to the region
where the ma in branch is 1oca ted. There is, however, a
regulation that might frustrate the _.ffort te encourage branch
banking. That is, the •entire country is divided into five
service • areas, and commercial and thrift banks opening up a
branch in any of these areas are required to buy five-year
special government or Central Bank securities according to the
following schedule:
a) Service Area I (Heavily overbranched areas) F 20M
b) Service Area II (Overbranched areas) _ 15M
c) Service Area III (Idealy branched areas) _ 10M
d) Service Area IV (Underbranched areas) _ 5M
e) Service Area V (Encouraged) 0
Rural banks are required to purchase special five-year
government/[_entral Bank securities worth _500,000 for each branch
opened. The idea that the Central Bank is able to know whether
there is undercompetition or overcompeticion in one area is
indeed questionable. The market is in a better position to know
it. •However, the recent collapse of a significant number of
banks has merely reinforced the Central Bank's view on this
issue. In fact', it has for the time being imposed a moratorium
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on the granting of license to open a new bank or branch since the
onset of the financial crisis. Many of! those banks collapsed due
to their over-dependence on the Central Ban_ rediscounting
facilities and poor supervision, not due to cutthroat
competition.
Aside from this, the deposit retention scheme may also work
against branching. Under this scheme, at least 50 percent of the
total deposits mobilized by branches of banks in the area where
they are given permission to operate should be lent to the same
area. This limits banks to manage their portfolio across
branches. While such scheme tries to ensure the flow _f funds to
the rural areas, which still remains a questionable fact, it
reduces the profitability of banks.
The reserve requirement has already been made uniform across
different types of short-term deposit liabilities (i.e., deposits
with maturities of 730 days of less), but not across different
types of banks. The present reserve requirement is 21 percent
for universal and comfaercial banks and 14 percent for thrift and
rural banks, even if they are subsidiaries/affiliates of
universal o_ colnmercial banks. The intention of the differential
reserve requirement across different types of banks is to offset
the cost advantages enjoyed by bigger banks. However, the recent
experience shows that bigger banks bought thrift and rural banks.
Thus, they also enjoy such privilege.
The deregulation of the bank interest rates was part and
parcel of the 1980 financial reforms. But while banks interest
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rates were deregulated, the cheap red iscounting policy 0f the
Central Bank which tended to favor certain economic activities
continued. It was only in November 1!985 that the Central Bank
shifted its emphasis from credit allocation to • stabilization
i
functions. Since then, all rediscountaDle papers are treated
i
uniformly in terms of rediscoui1t rate and loan value. Since the
rediscount rate has been aligned with the marke t •rate while at
the same time, ceilings on re-len-ding rates _Dr rediscounting
funds have been removed, cred it subsidies to previously
considered high priority sectors have virtually been eliminated.
The experience in the past was that credit subsidies only led to
• ••.-.misallocation of resources, • disint_rmediation and inflation, not
to mention the fact that they were highly regressive (see
Lamberte and Lim [1987]).
While credit subsidies are being phased out, risk-reducing
schemes are being introduced. Today, there are four guarantee
schemes in addition to the crop insurance scheme for rice and
corn. Their features are summarized in Table 2. CALF is the
latest addition to the _uarantee schemes. Its funds came
from the various credit programs managed by government agencies.
Unlike the <_previous special credit programs whose funds came
directly from the government and/or Central Bank, funds for on-
lending under these guarantee schemes have to come from the •
financial institutions. Thus, these guarantee schemes support
and facilitate private initiatives in financing economic
activities. Except for CALF which is just newly established, the
8
TabLe 2
SELECTED SPECIALCREDITPRDGRI_MS
Creoi_ Pro§rail Elm_LoieProjects •EligibleBorrowers Loan Purposes Na_imum Loanab[e Interest Maturity Mooe of .
..............,........................................................................_ _R_ouoL _Rat.e_............_P_er_id_........._P_X_,e,!....
i. Indu.str!al....... Those involvedin the A. Cottaoe_entsrprise- A. Purchase of A. For Cot(;age Jg_(oer R. FiNed asset ac- E_ua! euar-
Guaranteeand estab_ish_,_ntor expan- total assets over factorysite Industries- annum Quisition- _2 tp.r_yaT_or-
Loan Fund sion of an induz(;ria]: P50,@ON_u% _Ot more ,or new and P@.4M. inclusive years inclusive tiza_ionof
(IGLF) agro-ir,dustrialor ¢,;i- than PS@@:E,_'_"befh'6e'" expansion of all of a _,laxir_ur_of orinc.{aoa]
nine enterorisesinclu- financing, projec(;s, B, Sraall-5cal_ charoes, 3 y_ars grace 8 interest.
. _=nu,a,._rih_-con- peric,d on prin-
Corns and _,hoseservzce B. _._aii-Sca'..__Enter- B. Construction1 pal 9ay._lent.
ir,dustries supoortiv 5e - (;oral assets of factory
of manufac_uric,_acti more than PF_,@@_ .- buildiY B. _,},__rk;.ngcapital
vities. '" "or e_cee'_ PSM 7 years inclu-
for a co ._e fir_ar_ C, Purcha_. sire of a naxi-
eligible _s, ) rqachin_ _.,a_ oF 2 years
C. ,_aium-Scale ;_- eq_ipme _rac__oeriodor,
prises - tot :(;s fixturesano principal pay-.
'Iof more (;ha )5.0M" ,._en(;.
but not e ._ding
P2@N :fore
financing.
2. f_gricultural Agrl al and agro T l.ndividuals, sin[_le _)pm " A, _ - 18 _ A. Short-t_n'_a l?lq_ ""-"f_t_'l_y,_
Loan Fund processi j projects:_ rietorhips, par(;ner....ps_ ar ._rannum to e_ce_d )?. _,tarterly,j..
(ALF) corporations'andcoopera- exciudin_ :loatin_ ,'.,..r,t_% except <.._"-__'n,_-,
f_. Short-tone seaso- tires. _and. _nter_s_ for s_ar and e,._ar_ew'ly.
hal production rate) banana _"roduc-
creditprelects. B, Worki_ tion.
_. ,_ediu_and lc,n_- _. _,_di,.,.r, and
teru credit: pou]- Lon_-terr._
try orodu_tion, Loans - based
swine oroduction, on _rv,ec__'
cattle oroduction, cash flow b'It
f_sheries develc,_- ::9".:to _.___--
_:er,t plantation |5 y_ars inc!u-
prcLject% aoro- _ive of a _rac'e"
OVc,cessiF,g and .I)os(; e_.ri,_r,.J-"
harvest facili(;ies_ e__reedin¢ 7
and far[L:mechanize- years.
t i¢,n.
Cr•ect Proorafa Elioible Projects Eligible Borrowers Loan Purposes _axim_mLoanable Interest )lat,.irity v_:.deof
_mount Rate
............................... . _p_ri..qd_......... o__,_t....
3. Guarantee Projects involved irr A. S:nall Scale Projeots- R. Fi_ed asset_ • R, Small-Scale 15Y,per n, Work_na Capital Eeu_l
Fund for the direct production i als or enter- acquisition.- Loan - annum - f,_a.imua of - monthly,or
S_lal i and and /or prc,cessina of p P3@@,_,¢_ to fixed for 5 ,/_ars, inclu- euarterly
Medium food inter, deal for bie- B. Construction P_2.@M, term of 5ire of the one ar,_c,rtiza-
Enterprises logical consumption; B. Vedium Sca[e•,_rojects.,.. of plant • loan a_p- },ear trace tic, n,
(GFSY_E) those w_directlyinvol- - Filipino stockcot- facilities. B. M.edium-Scale roved for oeriodon _rin-
vL,d in food produ_ti_r, porations, Loan -more Euarantee ci_-ai fJayi,l_nt.
an_ other agri-oro_-_ct ; C. Working than P2_ to by the-
ma.jorityof its ._roduee capital. PB_. GFS,_. B. _c_uisitEon of
ts intendedfor e_por_, fixed _ssets
O. Ref£nancino r:laxilm*,u,_1of IC
A. 5n_all Scale- iota of existing year%ine!usive
project assets o loans with of the t_..,.--),ear
r_:k less tha other linen- craoe peric,o on
P62,5@_. but r,o cial ins_i- prir,cipal oay-
more than P2.5; h_tionsthat _,_ent.
after f inaneino, are current
it, statu_i
B. _ediu_ Scale not to exceed
total projec 55X of the
assets of r_lorethal of the total
PP.5M but not loan aoprov_d
e_ceeding Plk_
after'financing.
4. D_P-SSS Industrial,a0rieultural Individuals,single prop- Workingcapital, PSi_'_e,per- 17)¢_er Ti],'e_.Veers' _-,_.v_.nl.,,"
Fir,ar,cir,9 or agro- ind,strial rietorships,partnerships borrower.• annum _.a,'terly,
Proraram projects.(See Annex B and coroorations oiue set- s_r_i-
for a partial !ist of vice fee a_ml-,,_a;.[y.
eli§ibleprojects, of 4._oF?
ducted i5
advance.
5. Co'norehensive Any agricultural oro- Individual_,cor_rations _ny a_ricultural P5@¢,_ Fiwed ter_ _, Workingcapital E_,Lal
A_oricultural jacks provided total and cooperatives_ loan, for _orkin.o to be - 8 years, wnn_h!y or
Loan Fund orojects assets must capitalor acoui- determined D,T.'i_.-tmr]y.
(CALF) not e_c'eedPS_k_. simeon of fi_ed by the B. Fi_ed _sse_
assets, CPLF at the O._quisition
be_innin_o 12 years.
of the
quarter.
Table 2 (cont'd.)
track record of those schemes in terms of repayment rate has so
far been quite impressive.
Recently, however, loan availments th_-ough these schemes
have reached an all-time low. In the case of IGLF, the remaining
unutilized funds were returned to IBRD. There are reasons for
this. First, these g uarant6e programs are not known by other
banks. Hence, only few are really pushing for this prograia.
Second, the procedures for access-ing these facilities are very
cumbersome and processing usually takes about. 2 to 3 months.
Third, the interest rate is still fixed at a high ra_e despite
the fact that the general interest rate .has been going down.
Thus, this program appears to be very expensive to borrowers. In
fact, a lot of prepayments occurred recently in these programs.
And lastly, the margin offered to banks under these schemes is
very low, considering the fact that their transactions costs for
originating such loans and processing papers are quite high.
There is therefore a need to redesign these programs in
order to make them responsive to the credit needs especially of
those who are currently _.rationed out of the credit market.
Processing procedures have to be simplified and processing time
shortened SQ:_that loans can be released on the time they are most
needed by borrowers.
There are still a few special credit programs, however,
which are primarily aimed at supplementing the funds of banking
system. Examples are the DBP-SSS Financing Program and the ALF
Program (see Table 2 for their features). Unlike the previous
i2
special credit programs, _these credit programs cover a wider
range of economic activities and the interest rates are market
oriented, The utilization rate of these funds is however ver$'
slow mainly due to their poor or unpopular design° In the case
of the ALF for instance, the documentation procedure is so
complex, not to mention the fact that the interest rate is way
above the current market rate. Moreover, the •floating rate
applied during the term of the loan approved is not well
understood by less sophisticated bor_owerls. It is also less
popular to those who understand it in view of the general
expectation that the interest rate is going to rise is the near
future.
There are certain regulations that impinge on the
intermediation cost. The currently high reserve requirement, the
25 percent agri/agra loan requirement and the 5 percent gross
receipts tax (GRT) are taxes imposed on intermediation. Under a
competitive environment, all these taxes are supposed to be
absorbed by financial intermediaries. Unfortunately, however,
such environment does not exist in the Philippine setting. So,
%
banks fully pass on this tax burden to borrowers, who are paying
a rate higher than when such intermediation taxes are absent.
There seems to be a policy inconsistency here. While efforts are
made to stimulate investment by keeping the interest rate low and
affordable to investors, intermediation taxes are imposed that
jack up the interest rate.
One of the recent changes in monetary policy was the
reduction in the reserve requirement for short-term deposit
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liabilities from 24 percent to 21 percent. But this ra_io is
still 3 percentage points above the ratio before the onset of the
crisis. Thus, there is still some room for further reduction in
reserve requirement. The Central Bank should not stop at 18
percent, but should aim at a much lower reserve requirement, say
10 percent. In this case, more deposit: funds can be released for
on-lending at relatively lower rates.
The purpose of the agri/agra loan requirement is to increase
the flow of loans going to the agriculturalsector. This is
especially addressed to commercial banks whose _oans were
oriented towards the urban commercial sector .... However, this
policy has never accomplished its objective. Table 3 shows that
the share of agricultural loans in net loanabie funds as well as
in total loans outstanding of banks even declined after the
implementation of the agri/agra requirement policy as compared to
the previous years. What did it accomplish then? Since the
government securities eligible for the agri/agra requirement
carried a rate much lower than the market rate most of the time,
intermediaries were in effect being taxed. Since this tax were
passed on to non-agricultural sector in terms of higher interest
rate, the c_]atter were in effect being penalized. This is one
cross-sectoral subsidy program whose costs were borne by one
sector but without clear bet_efits enjoyed by society as a whole.
Thus, there . is a need to re-examine this loan portfolio
requirement.
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size of the banking system that reinvests funds, in potentially
t
new directions, from old loans as they mature (Mckinnon [1981]).
In 1965, Korea's ratio was about one-half of that of the
Philippines. It means that the Philippine financial systera
performed better than the Korean financial system in terms of
generating financial resources to support the economy. Five
years later, Korea's ratio surpassed that of the Philippines by a
wide margin. Since then, the Philippines was nct able to catch
up with Korea. One of the reasons for Korea's tremendous success
was the financial reforms it initiated in 1965 which were
primarily aimed at mobilizing domesticfinancial savings. The
Philippines undertook a major financial reform only in 1980. Its
effects on the ratio was positive, but more modest compared to
that realized by Korea. Towards the latter part of 1983, Korea
and the Philippines encountered financial difficulties. However,
their impact on the ratio was more severe in the Philippines than
in Korea, suggesting that the latter has a more solid financial
system.
The performance of Thailand's financial system has been very
impressive._ The financial ratio has been steadily increasing
unlike those of the Philippines and Korea which have been
fluctuating.
Another £ndicator of the performance of the financial system
is the efficiency with which it raises and allocates funds. This
is determined by the interest rate it gives to deposits, the
lending rate it charges to loans, and the spread between lending
21
and deposit rates. Indeed, one of the intentions of the 1980
I
financial reforms was to mobilize financial savings so that more
loanable funds would be made available to industries by assuring
depositors a positive real interest rate on their deposits. This
I
was to be accomplished by improving competition among banks. The
increased competitionamong banks was expected to result in the
narrowing of the spread between lending and deposit rates, since
banks would be more willing to absorb the increased deposit rate
by not raising the lending rate. Thus, both depositors and
borrowers stand to benefit from such development, hnlike the
previous repressive policy regime when only financial
intermediaries benefitted.
Table 6 presents the evolution of the nominal and real
interest rates and the bank spread. The latter refers to gross
bank spread since intermediation cost arising fr01a regulation,
e.g., reserve requirement, and administrative cost are not yet
netted out. The real deposit rates were positive for the period
1981 to 1982. However, the banks spread also widened, implying
that borrowers were paying _more when interest rates started to be
deregulated. It seems that there is a lack of _ompetition among
banks in t_[_ credit market, and the in£erest rate deregulation
only succeeded in hurting the borrowers more.
The financial crisis felt by the financial system in 1984
resulted in severely negative bank spread. Although, the lending
rate for new loans went to as high as 45 percent, loans which
were contracte_ in the previous period with a fixed _ate could
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_Tab]_e__6
NOMINALAND REALINTEREST_qTES
•I_I_QTIONRATE L_DIN6QQTE DEPOSIT"EQ[E* RE._ :!
(6DP) hO_ RERL" _ REAL. SPR_D :
1381 10.98 17. lt9 6.1_ 15;60 ,,.62 1,_13 :
1982 8. 43 18._19 9, 7? .4, _1 5. 78 4. _09 •
1%3 11.74 _19,331 1.7.59 i4,34 ?-6_ 4._39 :
!984 •48.93 26.743 --_; 18 r_'_ -_.6,45 -5,737 :
1985 17.71 28,234 10,5_. 1_,52 • ._.1c_. _2.7i_-:
1986 1.49 17,348, i5._6 ,_8,._ 8.•98,* 6._4 :
=e
_o_e:Lenoinora_erefers$o securealoansfor allmaturi¢ies,
•TimeOeoosit- 36_Days
•*TimeDeposit(4inQuarter)- R!! _turities
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not be recalled by banks (see also Remolona and Lambertel [1986]
for a related study). Thus, the weighted average ,-ending rate
for secured loans increased only to 27 percent in 1984. On the
other hand, many depositors pre-terminated their deposits and
bought new deposit instruments which had very high nominal
yields, thus, sending the nominal weighted average rate for time
deposits up to 33 percent. Banks tried to recou_e their losses
in the subsequent years by maintaining a wide spread even as the
interest rates were going down. _ne worst thing in this
situation is that strong and profitable firms which survived the
crisis were made to pay the losses incurred by banks with the
loanS they gave to weak and unprofitable firms. Today, the
interest rate on time deposit hovers around 6 percent while the
prime rate is about 12 percent. The spread, which is about 100
percent of the deposit rate, is still very high.
It is noteworthy that while the nominal lending rate has
been coming down starting in 1985, the real lending rate has been
moving in the opposite direction. In fact, the Current real
lending rates are unusually high by any standard. Even today
when the inflation rate is practically zero, the 12 percent prime
rate is c_nsidered abnormally high. This is One factor that
L_"
could weaken the ability of the economy to recover itself from
the slump. But this is not all. Learning from their experience
in 1984, banks are now charging floating or adjustable rates on
almost all the'ir loans. Indeed, this only adds more uncertainty
in the market, a development most unwelcomed by businessmen.
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The total resources oftthe banking system could give _s more
b
or less an indication of its capability to finanhe the economic
recovery. Between 1981 to 1983, the real resources of the
banking system had been increasing quite moderately (see Table
7). But the crisis which took place towards the latter part of
1983 reversed this trend. Several medium-size commercial banks,
thrift banks and rural banks became insolvent andwere later on
closed. In two years time, the real resources of the banking
/
system shrunk by 34 percent. There was a sharper drop in the
real loans outstanding since banks substantially redpced their
lending in favor of risk-free, high yieldin_ Central
Bank/government securities.
Banks have historically been focusing on short-term loans.
The 1980 financial reforms that encouraged banks, particularly
commercial banks, to lend long made some headway as the share of
medium- and long-term loans in the total loan portfolio of
commercial banks increased quite significantly (see Table 8).
But the recent financial crisis have made banks more cautious.
In fact, they have alread_ started reducing the share of their
long-term loans in their total portfolio. Development banks
which are_!_pposed to take care of the l_ng-term 'requirements of
industries could not meet the large demand for long-term funds,
not to mention the fact that many of them, including DSP, are
presently in financial distress. In fact, recently the biggest
private development with substantial exposure to foreign
multilateral loans folded up.
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.._-a--_ie 7
_E S _,T_ BF&_I_W_BYSTE)n,N(]_,IINAL(!nBillion_=s_
RESOURCES _C OF TOT_.LOANS _3 BOP )318DP :
MONSYS Du.TSTPJ_DIN _ .(.%_) (._Ce_) :
!98! _._ 115,77 _,51 &?.._ 3_o_ .2_9233 :
!982 339.17 141.49 98,24 95.27 34_, 60 .27971IB :
1983 430.93 ,171.40, i 11.39 i 1z'.% 384..69.• ,2936_8 :
1984 487.24 167:01 116. 38 121.22 539.41" .22471a2. :
1985 502=50 156.75 87.57 132;8a 6_5,5?. ,2!8k)i_:
'.986 528,00 14_,47 87.60* I@9.2_2 619,_@ ._4_19 :
•_r:UN_ _RRTER
RESDURCE,S OF THE BAN_INBSYSTEm,_ (InBillior,Pesos)
RESI_E£$. NDCOF TOT_.Lb-"A,_ M3 BDP _.R/BDP :
"" MOWSYS OUTST_DIN6
-;
1_I 94.03 ,36.49 27,_ 2'5.87 96.21 .L--_9233 :
1982 98,58 .41.13 _B._ 27.69 99,00 ,_797]18 :
1983 112,10 44.58 28.97 29,_ !_0,07 .2%&4_ :
1984 _. 10 L_. 17 20, 33 21. !7 _4.?_2 .2247182 :
1985 74.56 23._ 12,99 19.72 9e.44 .2:_:25 .'
1986 77.20 _0.54 12.81 21._ 9@,61 .240B019:
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Table 8
COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS AND LOANS
(_B, 1978 PRICES _)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Total Deposits 30.4 34.4 38 40.1 30.8 28.4
Share demand 29 22 16 17 13 12
Share time & 71 78 84 83 87 88
savings
Loan Outstanding 55.6 55.1 56.7 58.7 40_6 27.1
Share short term 78 73 69 70 61 61
Share medium & 22 27 31 39 39 39
long term
* Deflated by the CPI
Source: World Bank Report (1986).
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The movements of key economic and financial indicatolrs in
I
1986 seemed to be encouraging. GNP growth rate t_irned positive
after a negative growt h rate for two successive years. Inflation
was practically negligible. The flow of loanable funds and the
financial resources of the banking system (in real terms) Started
to pick up. Outstand _ng loans of banks and Central Bank
rediscounting to banks im_J_.ed moderately. The M3/GDP ratio
rose slightly to 24 percent from 21 percent the previous year.
With these bright prospects for the economy in the near future,
the financial system is expected to play a more positive role.
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IV. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF KBs, PDBs, AND RBS
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL
This section compares the performance of KBs (including both
universal and ordinary commercial banks), PDBs and RBs at the
regional level. All head offices of KBs are located in the
National Capital Region (i.e. Region IV), but their branches are
spread all over the othe_ 12 regions (see Table 9). Although
most of their branches are situated in provinci=l capitals and/or
prime cities and towns, however, thei_ banking opera$ions extend
to all over the province and region. Wihh regard to PDBs, a
significant number of their head offices are located outside the
I
National Capital Region (NCR). Specifically, 20 out of 45 head
offices of PDBs operate outside NCR as of December 1985. They
have very few branches compared to commercial banks. Usually,
their branches are located in provinces or regions close to the
province or region where their head offices are situated.
Originally, RBs were supposed to be unit banks only. But
after the 1980 financial reforms they are already allowed to open
up branches in other towo_s/cities within a certain region
subject to the branching regulations discussed in Section II.
Even then, very few of them have opened up branches. Lately,
quite a number of them became subsidiaries of commercial banks.
Essentially, we will be comparing the performance of
branches of KBs with either head offices or branches of PDBs and
head offices of rural banks operating at a certain region. The
reason why the _omparison is done at the regional level is that
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the most d isaggregative data published by the Central Bank
regarding the financial performance of branches of banks s!top at
the regional level. Specifically, balance sheets and income
statements of branches and/or head offices of banks belonging to
the same type of bank are aggregated at the regional level.]
Note, however, that there are no PDBs operating in Regions II, IX
and XII. In some regions, very few PDBs are operating.
The performance of branches of KBs, PDBs and RBs will be
evaluated on the basis of the following indicators: (a) strength
in deposit mobilization; (b) bank stability; and (c)
profitability. The volume of deposits per brancn anQ the ratio
of deposits to total resources are used as measures of the
strength in deposit mobilization. For bank stability the ratio
of loan portfolio to deposit liabilities is utilized. Liquidity
ratio could not be used here since data on liquid assets are not
available. A single measure of profitability is used here, i.e.,
the ratio of net operating income to operating income. The rate
of return on equity could have been another good measure of bank
profitability. However, it is very difficult to derive such
measure because of the prob'lem involved in determining the equity
of branches of banks. Indeed, the number of performance
indicators we are using for this study is very• limited because of
the unavailability of some data.
The comparison will be done over a 3-year period, i.e., from
1983 to 1985 to see if the relative performance of the three
types of banks is consistent over these years. Incidentally, the
recent economic crisis started towards the second semester of
34
1983, and the economic downswing continued for two consecutive
years. The economic conditions of the 13 regions also followed
this trend, as may be gleaned fro a the mow_ments of t}_e
respective regional gross domestic products (GDPs) in real terms
(see Table 9). Both the commercial and rural banks seemed to be
adversely affected by the crisis as raay be gathered from the
declining number of banking offices over the period 1983 to 1985.
The number of offices of PDBs have either remained the same or
have slightly increased during the same period.
Strength in Deposit Mobi_lization
KBs' deposit mobilization is more extensive than PDBs and
RBs'. The average deposit per branch of KBs in 1985 ranged from
_28M to _52M in regions outside the NCR (see Table i0). This is
about 3 to 5 times the average deposit per branch of PDBs.
Except for one region, rural banks rank the last among the
three groups of banks in terms of the volume of deposits per
branch. It should however be noted that branches of KBs and PDBs
tend to locate in cities and towns where bigger deposit accounts
can be found, whereas rural banks are sprea d all over the
countryside_ including smaller towns. The ranking of the three
groups of banks over the 3-year period has been fairly
consistent.
The ratio of deposit liabilities to total resource indicates
where most of the resources of banks come from. The higher the
ratio, the more successful the banks are in mobilizing deposits.
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KBs have the highest ratio among the three groups o£ banks _in all
the regions. Except for two regions, the ratios are quite high
at between 75 to 91 percent in 1985.
One notable feature here is that the ratio of deposit:
liabilities to total resources of KBs in the NCR has been very
low at about 34 to 37 percent during the period 1983 to 1985.
There are reasons for•this. One is that the head offices of KBs
bear most of the physical resources such as, buildings, office •
equipment, etc. for the entire bank_including branches. The
other reason •is that the head offices haqe• ready access to the
rediscount windows of the Central Bank which augment their
resources. Still another reason is that they are the main users
of funds mobilized by their branches outside the NCR.
with regard to the low ratio of deposit liabilities to total
resources in Region VI, we surmise that this is due to the KBs'
inability to mobilize deposits.
The PDBs rank second in terms of the ratio of deposit
liabilities to total resources, although very much far behind the
KBs. However, they were outperformed by RBs in at least three
regions. It is noteworthy•that in regions close to the NCR,
I
spe_i_idaYi_y Reglon III and Region IV-A, _ne ra_los are more than
twice the ratios in other regions. Here, both supply and demand
could have worked together. From the demand side, the two
regions have incomes relatively higher than the other regions,
except the NCR as may be gathered from their GDP values. This is
translated into higher demand for deposit instruments. On the
40
supply side, PDBs head offices and/or branches close to Metro
i
Manila are professionally managed and therefore tend to be more
competitive. The same finding can be observed with regard to the
rural banks located near the NCR.
It is noteworthy that the ratios of deposit liabilities to
total resources of KB$, PDB_ and RBs had been increasing in
almost all the regions during the period 1983-1985. In some
regions, like Region X, the increase in the ratio of KBs has been
phenomenal. During this period:, monetary policy was
contractionary and the Central Bank practically blosed its
t
rediscounting window, except for export pa@ers. With cheap money
already unavailable, and the interest rates on CB bills and
Treasury bills very high, banks responded by offering high-
yielding deposit instruments in order to stay competitive.
Stability
The loan to deposit ratio "indicates the extent which a bank
overstretches its resources to provide loans" (World Bank Report
[1986]). The higher the ratio, the more unstable the bank is.
Normally, the ratio should not exceed 100 percent because banks
have still _o provide reserves for their deposits. In addition,
a portion of the deposits is usually invested in equities and/or
securities as part of the portfolio diversification of banks.
Accordingly, Japanese banks are required to keeQ the ratio below
80 percent.
In 1985, KBs' loan to deposit ratios ranged between 20 to 45
percent in almost all regions, except in the NCR and Region VI.
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tWhile below i00 percent, these ratios are surprisingly low. It
should be pointed out that branches o[ KBs are cow-_red by the
deposit retention scheme and therefore, the ratios should have
not gone below 50 percent. However, w:ith the results, _t appears
that this regulation is not being strictly followed and enforced,
Most of the deposit funds of branches of commercial banks could
have gone to the NCR since the loan to deposit ratio in this
=
region exceeds 100 percent. This tends to show that KBs regard
their branches located in areas outside Metro Manila as mainly
4
deposit taking institutions. It is highly possible then that
their branches have greater discretionarypower with ,regard to
raising deposits but have very limited decision making power with
regard to originating loans. Moreover, head offices may have
i
regarded commercial and industrial loans in the NCR more
profitable and less risky than agricultural loans in the
countryside. This is an issue worthwhile watching in the
forthcoming survey.
PDBs' and RBs' loan to deposit ratios greatly exceed i00
percent in almost all regions and in almost all the years.
Indeed, a significant proportion of their loans were supported
not by depo_its but by borrowings from the Central Bank and other
government agencies having special credit programs. As such,
they acted merely as conduits or brokers of Central Bank and
government funds, rather than real banks. They are more exposed
to risk since a sudden change in policy could immediately put
them in a difficult situation. Indeed, this happened in the
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recent past when the _entra! Bank tightened its rediscountiing
L
policy.
It is interesting to note that PDBs located near Metro Manila
have loan to deposit ratios lower than i00 percent. In the case
I
of Region III-A, the ratio more or less falls within the normal
range except in the las_t, year. It seems that the_e PDBs in this
region operate like a real bank whose loans mostly come from
deposits they have mobilized. In Reaion III_ however, PDBs
behave like branches of KBs. They'-have lower loan to deposit
ratio, suggesting that most of their deposits were _rans_erred
to their respective head offices in the NCR.
Note that the loan to deposit ratio of all groups of banks
had been declining in almost all regions during the period 1983-
1984. This was the result of two factors. One is that loans
outstanding of banks declined due to general economic crisis. A
significant proportion of their funds were instead invested in
government securities. The other factor is that they were able
to raise more deposits by offering higher interest rates. As
already pointed out above,° banks offered very high interest on
deposits to compete with government securities.
The overall picture that can be drawn from the findings is
that in regions outside Metro Manila, KBs are specializing in
deposit mobilization to support the lending activity of their
head offices located in Metro Manila, whereas PDBs and RBs are
specializing in lending with most of the funds coming from
special credit programs of the government. The implications of
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this to our study comparing:the performance of KBs, PDBs and_RBs
is clear. It means that we; have to exercise .extra care ini
comparing the performance of different types of banks usin_
standard ratios. A branch may be pursuing an objective different;
from that of a unit bank. This has to be sorted out first before
drawing any conclusion. For example, we found that the loan to
deposit ratios of branches of commercial banks are below !00
i
percent, "but the very low ratio made us to suspect that they are
only performing one function of banking. 'However, it should be
noted that their function is dictated by tha Overall objective of
the mother bank.
Profitability
As mentioned above, our measure of profitability is the
ratio of net operating income to total operating income. It
indicates to what extent banks were able to control their
operational costs. The higher these ratio, the more profitable
the bank is due to mangement's ability to control costs.
There is a peculiar pattern that we observe here regarding
the profits realized by banks. Branches of commercial banks in
a l__aost--_-li-_--r-e-g_o-_-.4-incurrednegative net profits (see Table 9).
- \,_2
This could be the result of two factors. One is that branches of
PNB which have been incurring huge losses have dominated the
branches of KBs. In 1985 alone, total losses of the government-
owfied Philippine National Bank (PNB) amounted to _7.2 billion.
Unfortunately, however, we could not find a way of segregating
PNB branches away from the rest of the branches of KBs given the
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data available on hand. The other is that their volume of
deposits was much larger than their loans, hence, their interest
; I
expense on deposits greatly exceeded their interest income on
loans. AS we have pointed out earliel=, branches of commercial
banks in the regions are mainly deposit taking institutions.
Note that it is only in the NCR and Region VI where KBs ,realized
positive net profits. These are the only areas where KBs lending
activity _was concentrated as indicated by their loan to deposit
ratios that exceeded i00 percent. Consequently, their interest
income was more than their interest expense in these two regions.
The case of PDBs is somewhat similar to that Of KBs. For
instance, PDBs in Region III incurred negative net profits mainly
due to the fact that their interest expense exceeded their
interest income. In other words, they have lower volume of loans
as compared to their volume of deposits. However, in regions
where PDBs lending activity is quite substantial, positive net
profits were realized.
Among the three groups of banks, only RBs in all regions
have consistently earned positive profits during the period 1983-
85. This seems to be surprising considering the fact that RBs
suffered mQ_t from the recent economic crisis'. It should,
however, be noted that the data we are using are based on the
unaudited reports of the RBs submitted to the Central Bank. Most
banks did not .incorporate in their reports the valuation reserves
required by the CB examiners.
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On the basis of these findings, it is then very hard_• to
compare profitability of branches of KBs and PDBs with that of
unit banks using the ratio of net ope:_ating income to operating
income as the measure of profitability. In the first place,
branches of cormaercial banks could afford losses •so long as the
consolidated profits of the bank as a whole are positive (see
Section VI for an analysis of individual bank's profits) .
Secondly, _ the data available on ha_nd cannot be used for the said
purpose. The true picture of the financial, statements especially
RBs must be obtain'ed in the first place. Secondly, other
i
measures of profitability that would take into account the
varying characteristics of the three groups of ban_s can be
i
devised. For example, the contribution of branches of KBs to the
overall profits of the bank even if they are not the ones
directly lending providing that the funds come from them must be
estimated. We suspect that the data on which our present
analysis is based do not reflect this simply because they were
compiled by branches of banks usin_ the standard accounting
procedure. This should be taken into consideration in the
forthcoming comparative batik study.
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V. THE INTEREST RATE ELASTICITY AND INSTITUTION
ELASTICITY HYPOTHESES
The potential for mobilizing savings has !on_ been
recognized. But it is only recently when the Country is facinc_
severe foreign exchange crisis that policies are finetune_Z _to tap
the saving potentials o_f.the dc_nestic economy.
The _project: "Comparative Bank Stu_y" will address the
extent of banks' success in mobilizin(_ financial savinas. In
" ,i
looking at the issue_of savings mobilization, _ two variables are
always given more importance. One is interest rate, and it is
hypothesized that financial savings respond positively to
4
interest rate. The other is the availability of financial
!
institutions, and the hypothesis here is that savers are induced
to save in financial forms if they have easy access to financial
institutions. Lamberte (1987) reviewed the studies which
directly or indirectly tested these hypotheses. The results were
found to be mixed and no definitive conclusion could be reached.
In view of the importance of the issues involved, this
background paper attempts to examine again the interest rate
elasticity _and the institution elasticity hypotheses. It does
not, of course, intend to settle the debate, but we nerely want
to provide an alternative way of verifying the hypotheses that
could perhaps be useful to the comparative bank study.
The model is as follows:
FD = f (i , BANKS, GDP) (i)
o
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FD stands for financial deposits with banks. Data are
obtained not from the households but from the banks. Bank
deposits then are used as the proxy for household financial
savings. The weakenes of this proxy is, of •course, obvious.
First of all, it excludes cash, insurance claims, bonds as
I
instruments of financial savings. Cash is one of the most
important forms of financial savings in the rural areas.
Secondly, it includes•corporate, institutional households and
government deposits.
The variable, i , refers to the effective iDterest on
D i•
deposits. This is derived by dividing the actual interest
expense on•deposihs by the Outstanding deposits of ban_s. This
is one aspect that makes our study different frora the previous
studies which used either the statutory or reported actual
interest rates on savings or time deposits or the weighted
average of both.
BANKS refers to the number of bank offices of each _ype of
banks in a region, while GDP stands for gross domestic product of
a region.
This _tudy makes use of a combination of cross-section and
time series data. This is another aspect that makes our study
different from the previous ones. Data on deposits, effective
interest rates, number of branches for KBs, PDBs and RBs are
available for the 13 regions. The study covers the period 1983-
85. Note that the interest rate policy regime is the same in all
these years. 5ome of the previous studies tested the two
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hypotheses mentioned above not knowing that the data unil£zed
L
included different interest rate policy regimes.
Equation (i) was estimated using OLS. The ti_r_e du$_y
variables (i.e., DUMB3 for 1983 and DUMB4 for 1984) did not yield
significant coefficients. So, they were dropped in the _ final
runs. The results are sum_ar_'zed in Table ii. Model I includes
all the identified independent variables. All nave the expected
signs. However, the coefficient- of GDP is E_ot statistically
significant. The equation seems reasonable on tlie basis of the
2
R and F-statistic. The elasticities computed at the means are
also shown in the same table. It appears that the presence of
more banking institutions in the regions has:-greater impact on
deposits than high interest rate in the regions. This seems
reasonable since high interest rate does not mean anything to
people in the provinces if financial institutions are not
accessible to them.
Previous studies encountered severe coll inearity problem
between GDP and BANKS. Specifically, increase in bank network
was found to be strongly co.rrelated with income. Thus, B_{KS was
found to have no significant effect in previous studies. We have
tried to c_,:gck whether this problem appears in our case. Model
II reestimated equation (1 ) without GDP. The estimated
cofficients and elasticities of i have virtually remaine_d <he
D
same. In Model III, we dropped BANKS from the equation. The
result is that GDP has a significant effect on deposits while i
2 D
does not have. However, the R considerably drops to a very
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Table Ii
RESULTS OF TESTING THE INTEREST RATE ELASTICITY
AND INSTITUTION ELASTICITY HYPOTHESES
MODEL I Model II Model III
Coefficients
Constant -7423. 300 -7143.9 -4911.0
(-7.72)* (-8.55) * (-2.01)*
iD 6348. i00 6405.4 -370.88
(2.20)* (2.22)* (-0.05)
BANKS iii. 0300 112.42
(24.08)* (28.34)*
GDP 0. 00998 - .21444
(0.59) (5.79)*
2
R .88 .88 .23
F 266. 168" 401.55* 16.77*
Elasticities
iD 0.277 0.280 -0.016
BANKS 2.540 2.572
GDP 0.106 2.289
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values.
* - significant at 5 percent.
5O
low level, suggesting that Model III is a mode] inferior compared
to Models I and II.
The inescapable conclusion drawn fro_a the results is t|,at
the interest and institution elasticity hypotheses cannot be
rejected using the approach and data of this study.
We proceed further by examining the demand for deposit
instruments of KBs, PDBs and RBs. Equation (I) was run
separately for KBs, PDBs and RBs. The results are presented in
Table l2.
Deposits with KBs are found to increase with an _ncrease in
the interest rate on deposits. This is not however the icase with
PDBs and RBs. In fact, the sign of the coefficients of interest
rate is negative for both groups of banks. It should be noted
that during this period, there was a general nervousness in the
financial system. Many depositors shifted their deposits from
small to bigger banks and from thrift and rural banks to branches
of commercial banks which were perceived to be relatively more
stable.
The number of offices has a significanh positive effect on
deposits wi'_h KBs, PDBs and RBs. In the case of KBs, an
additional branch openend brings about additional deposits of
_127 million. In contrast, an additional branch or head office
of KBs and PDBs attracts only _6 million and ?4 million,
respectively.
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Table 12
DEMAND FOR DEPOSIT INSTRUMENTS OF KBs, PDBs and RBs
KBs PDBs RBs
Constant -16904.00 -119.44 -105.70
(-6.33)* (-3.68)* (-1.99)**
iD 108640_00 -16.447 -520.11
(3.96)* (-0.30) (-1.64)
BANKS 127.00 6.167 3.967
(19.14)* (6.55)* (16.16)*
GDP -0.0695 51.6321 15.422
(-1.70)** (7.98)* :(4.19)*
2 i
R 0.98 0.93 40.88
F 596.81" 134.23" 97.45*
_7_ r
Note: * Significant at 5 percent level.
•* significant at i0 percent level.
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The effect of regiodal income on deposits with KBs _ is
negative and statistically significant ._t 10 percent level. This
is indeed surprising and difficult to explain. Perhaps, more
analysis is needed in this regard.
]
With regard to PDBs and RBs, regional income is found to
have a significant positive effect on deposits. It means that
improvement in regional income is important to PDBs and RBs in
raising deposits.
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VI. FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL COMMERCIAL BANKS
In Section IV, we have obserw_d that branches of KBs
obtained negative profits. We have pointed out that this is not
necessarily the case if the bank in its entirety is examined.1
This section focuses on the performance Of individual com_uercial
banks using their consolidated financial statements. This should
give us idea regarding comlnercial banks to be included in the
comparative bank study and at the same time, help us analyze the
primary data to be gathered later on from sample branches of
]
commercial banks.
Presently, there are 30 operatihg commercial banks. Nine of
them are authorized to operate as universal banks. Ten banks have
more than 50 branches (see Table 13). It can however be observed
that majority of the branches are concentrated in the National
Capital Region.
The financial system underwent two crises since 1981. Both
crises exposed the weaknesses of several commercial banks. In
the first crisis, six couuuercial banks encountered severe
financial difficulties. For fear of a global bank run, the
?
government _:ttempted to rehabilitate all of them. The assistance
came in the form of equity infusion, CB advances and government
deposits (see Table 14). The government eventually took over
these banks in. view of its huge exposures. Recently, InterBank
was able to sell 40 percent o_ government equity to a foreign
financial institution.
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Table 14
GOVERNMENT'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ACQUIRED BANKS
(As of December I@84)
(_ Million)
Government Government Parent CB
Bank Equity Deposits Advances Advances
Associated 407.D 16 24.9 297.4
COMBANK 322.0 97 174.0 154.8
Inter Bank 530.0 3 - 43.9
Pilipinas 240.0 92 150.4 241.3
Republic - 25 - 1666.9
Union 309.0 987.6 850.0 24.4
Source: Financial Reports of Individual Banks.
The second financial crisis further brought down a number of
badly managed banks. This time, the government made a big change
with regard to its policy towards ailinc! banks. It allowed the
closure of two commercial banks, namely Pacific Banking
Corporation and the Philippine Veterans Bank. The same policy
has been applied to other type_ of banks encountering the same
problems.
As already mentioned above, the 1980 financial reforms
encourage mergers/consolidation to reduce the number of
i
commercial banks in the system and at the same time broaden the
ownership of the remaining big banks. This policy _hrust has
hardly produced any positive result. What happened instead was
that bigger banks completely bought out other banks. For
instance, Bank of the Philippine Islands bought Family Bank and
Trust Co., a universal bank, and converted it into a thrift bank.
The Philippine Commercial International Bank completely absorbed
Insular Bank of Asia and America.
To examine the performance of individual banks, it is useful
to group them into four groups: private domestic commercial
banks (29), • branches of foreign commercial banks (4), government
-acquired commercial banks (6), and government-owned commercial
bank (1 ).
Of the 29 _orivate commercial banks, only 8 are listed in the
two stock exchanges. The rest are still closed, family-owned
corporations (see Patrick and Moreno [1984] for a related study).
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The size of com_aercial banks vast:iy varies (see Table !!5).
Eight out of thirty banks have assets above _IQ bill io6. PNB
remains the biggest commercial bank even if its current size is
reduced to about one-half of its previous size as outlined in its
rehabilitation scheme. Citibank, a foreign-owned bank, is the
second biggest commercial bPnk with assets amounting to _27
billion. Bank of America (BA) and Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) rank the third biggest banks, while Metro Bank and PCIB are
the fourth biggest banks, followed closeiy by UCPB and Far East
Bank in that order. COMBANK and Pilipinas Bank are the smallest
i
co_0ercial banks with assets less than }62 billion.
The growth in assets of banks over the period 1980-85 had
been widely uneven. Bigger banks achieved phenomenal growth in
assets well in excess of i00 percent during this six-year period.
Thus, they were able to maintain their relative position in the
banking system. In contrast, most small banks realized very slow
growth. Hence, the size difference between big and small banks
has widened since the 1980 financial reforms.
The eight big banks, ;that is, those whose assets exceeded
_i0 billion as of December 1985, have a fairly wide deposit base.
They contrGiled 62.4 percent of the total deposits in the
commercial banking system. Except for PNB, the growth in their
deposits over the period 1980-85 had been very high, way above
100 percent. "In contrast, the growth in deposits of small banks
had been low, mostly below 100 percent over the same period. It
is noteworthy that in almost all banks, the growth in deposits
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outstripped the growth in assets over the period 1980-85. It
means that banks have been increasingly relying o_ deposits for
their lending and investment operations. The interest rate
deregulation and the change in the rediscounting policy of the
Central Bank seemed to produce favorable results on deposits.
The branches of foreign-owned commercial banks are however the
obvious exemptions in this regard. They mainly rely on resources
of their head offices, not to mention the fact that they are not
allowed to have branches anywhere in th_ country.
The year 1985 was bad for the economy as GNP plu_ged by 3.8
percent, but not necessarily for banks. The hefty profits
realized by them were partly due to the high yields o_ risk-free
government and CB securities. There were however four banks, one
for each bank group, which incurred losses. PNB's staggering
loss of _7 billion in 1985 was extremely high.
Table 15 'also shows the loan to deposit ratio of each bank
for the year 1985. Almost all of the private domestic banks had
ratios below 80 percent, the level considered as normal.
However, the ratios were extraordinarily low for most banks. The
unstable situation in 1985 coupled with the sharp drop in demand
for credit_ compelled banks to switch a substantial portion of
theft resources to government and CB securities. The only
exception to this case is Manila Bank whose loan to deposit ratio
reached 121 percent. Its financial situation has recently
reached crisis proportion, and the CB has already stepped in to
prevent [urther dissipation of its assets.
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For foreign banks, a high loan t:o deposit ratio ks not
surprising. As already pointed out earlier, these banks depend
more on the resources of their head offices.
PNB and four government-acquired commercial banks obtained
loan to deposit ratios well in excess of i00 percent. This
indicates that these banks are financially unstable because they
are overstreching their resources to provide loans. It is indeed
surprising to know that after taking over the four commercial
banks for quite some time already, the government is still unable
to restore financial stability to these banks.
The ratio of net income to gross income substanti_!ly varies
across banks. The average ratio for the five big private
commercial banks was 9.4 percent compared to only 5.9 percent for
small private commercial banks. The average ratio for the six
government-acquired banks which was 6.9 percent was at least
comparable to that obtained by small private commercial banks.
The rate of return on equity realized by individual banks
also varies considerably. The average rate of return on equity
for the five big banks was quite high at 16.2 percent. Although,
average ra_e of return on equity of small banks was only 9.2
. C%
percent, it was still well above the 6.1 percent average rate of
return on equity realized by the six government-acquired
commercial banks.
Some patterns have clearly emerged in our analysis. Big
private commercial banks' performance had been quite hapressive
even during the crisis period. In contrast, government-owned and
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acquired commercial banks _ performed miserably_ Its Qverall
J
performance was not even at par with the pecformance of small
private commercial bank. But among private commercial banks, the
performance varies considerably, with bigger banks performing
better than smaller banks.
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The general objective of this paper: is to provide a general
background to the forthcomingcomparative bank studies which will
primarily make use of primary data to be collected from a sample
of rural banks (RBs), branches of con_ercial banks (KBs) and
branches or head offices of private development banks (PDBs).
I
The findings here could aid in formulating the research design
for the comparative bank studies.
The results here indeed pose some challenge to the
researchers in comparing performance of RBs, KBs and the PDBs.
We have observed that the performance of these financiali
institutions is in some way conditioned by the operating policy
framework. For example, RBs and PDBs did little savings
mobilization because of the financial support they got from the
government and Central Bank. In contrast, KBs' branches did
intensive savings mobilization drive in regions outside the NCR.
One notable finding, however, is that RBs and PDBs operating near
NCR operate like branches of KBs. The strong competitive
environment could have compelled them to Operate as efficiently
as branches of KBs. Thus, performance of the three financial
institutions is also conditioned by the structure of the market
in a certain region.
The findings also provide warning in using standard
financial indicators to compare performance of the three banking
institutions. For example, the three financial picture of the
RBs has to be obtained first. Perhaps, the Central Bank method
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of providing valuation reserves will be applied. Another _xample
!
is that the real profits realized by branches of. [KBs have _to be
obtained. Here,• their contribution to the overall profits of the
entire banks has to be estimated.
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